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ABSTRACT: Using annual data collected from 1988 to 2014, this study provides evidence of 
a nonlinear relationship between military spending, economic growth and other growth 
determinants for the South African economy. The empirical study is based on estimates of a 
logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR) model and our empirical results point to an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between military spending and economic growth for the data. 
Furthermore, our empirical results suggest that the current levels of military spending, as a 
component of total government expenditure, are too high in the South African economy and 
need to be transferred towards more productive non-military expenditure in order to improve 
the performance of economic growth and other growth determinants. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the seminal work of Benoit (1973, 1978), the effects of military expenditure 
on economic growth has been extensively investigated and the consensus drawn so far is that 
the precise relationship between the two variables is at best inconclusive. In differing from 
other forms of government expenditure, military spending presents quite an interesting case 
because such spending exerts both causes and consequences on the macroeconomy. One of the 
prevalent viewpoints in the academic literature is that military spending is helpful towards 
economic growth since it provides a variety of public infrastructures which aid an economy to 
enhance physical capital, human capital (such as education, nutrition, medical care and 
training) and domestic security (D’Agostino et. al., 2011). Contrariwise, a smaller portion of 
the literature contends that military spending may impede economic growth because it is an 
obstacle to the use of government spending for the civilian sector which is deemed to be more 
productive in stimulating economic growth (Ali and Dimitraki, 2014). In this later case, the 
transfer of resources from civilian to the military hampers economic growth through a 
crowding out effect of consumption and investment. 
  
Up-to-date, most empirical studies have assumed linearity in analysing the military-
growth relationship. And yet this assumption of linearity may be trivializing the whole issue 
since it has been previously documented that both the military expenditure and economic 
growth time series variables evolve nonlinearly over the steady state (see Fiaschi and Lavezzi 
[2007] and Lau et. al. [2015]). Stroup and Heckelman (2001) highlight that the introduction of 
nonlinearity in the military-growth nexus may serve to bridge two contrasting view-points by 
hypothesising a sign change of the relationship after crossing some optimal or threshold value. 
A theoretical rationale for the presence of nonlinearities is that the marginal effect of a change 
in military burden is not constant across different levels of the variable (Cuaresma and 
Reitsschuler, 2004). Moreover, over the last couple of decades or so, economies worldwide 
have been subject to a number of structural changes. Failure to empirically account for these 
structural changes may lead to the well-known problem of spurious regression estimates. 
Therefore, a shift from the conventional assumption of linearity to that of nonlinearity is quite 
significant in the development of empirical research regarding the military-growth relationship. 
 
There have been a handful of empirical works which have investigated the relationship 
between military spending and economic growth for the South African economy and these 
studies generally advocate for a negative relationship between the two variables (Dunne and 
Vougas (1999), Dunne et. al. (2000), Batchelor et. al. (2000) and Aye et. al. (2014)). Notably, 
all of these studies assume a symmetric military-growth relationship for the South African 
economy. However, as noted by Aye et. al. (2014), ignoring nonlinearities in the military-
growth relationship for the South African economy will likely result in misleading inference 
drawn from estimates obtained from a linear econometric model. Our study hereby contributes 
to the existing literature by investigating a possible nonlinear relationship between military 
growth and economic growth for South Africa. For empirical purposes we choose the smooth 
transition regression (STR) model. We favour this particular model on the basis of its 
superiority in comparison to other nonlinear econometric models like the TAR and the Markov 
Switching (MS) models which are considered deficient on account of assuming an abrupt 
transition within the model regimes. In addition, the STR framework allows the determination 
of the time series variable responsible for regime switching behaviour to be an inherent part of 
the modelling process. 
 
Having provided the backdrop to our study, we structure the rest of the paper as follows. 
The next section of the paper provides a review of the associated literature. The third section 
presents the theoretical and empirical models used in the study whereas the testing and 
estimation of the LSTR model is done in the fourth section of the paper. The fifth section 
concludes the paper in the form of policy recommendations and also suggests avenues for 
future research. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As has been previously mentioned, academic researchers are increasingly 
contemplating on the idea of a nonlinear relationship between military spending and economic 
growth. For convenience sake, one can categorize these nonlinear studies into three broad 
strands of empirical research. The first group of these studies are those which used cross-
sectional variations over panel data estimates and also over time periods to verify this notion 
of nonlinearity within the empirical data. A conspicuous example of such a study is that of 
Hooker and Knetter (1997) who investigate the impact of military spending on unemployment 
for panel data comprising of the 50 states in the US over data collected from 1963 to 1992. The 
authors are able to find that states with greater dependence on military spending have larger 
elasticities of unemployment with respect to military spending. In other words, decreases in 
military spending will lead to proportionately larger increases in unemployment rates in those 
states with a large share of military spending as opposed to those states with lower shares of 
military spending. Another study worth taking note of is that of Stroup and Heckelman (2001) 
which uses time variations in order establish nonlinearities in the military-growth relationship 
for 44 African and Latin American countries. Particularly the authors establish nonlinearities 
within the panel data by estimating military spending-economic growth regression across three 
separate growth periods namely, 1975-1989, 1980-1984 and 1984-1989. The findings of the 
study reveal that periods exhibiting low levels of military spending and labour use have a 
positive yet diminishing effect on economic growth. However, this positive influence turns 
negative during periods with higher levels of military spending and labour usage.  
 
The second strand of nonlinear studies found in the literature are those which 
investigate the nonlinear relationship between military spending and growth using variants of 
the threshold autoregressive (TAR) models introduced by Tong and Kim (1981) and modified 
by Tsay (1998) and Hansen (2000). A popular citation amongst these studies is that of 
Cuaresma and Reitsschuler (2003) who use a two-regime TAR model to estimate the nonlinear 
military-growth relationship for the US economy using data collected from 1929-1999. The 
authors use two theoretical approaches in their empirical analysis; with the first approach being 
a growth equation framework and the second being a production function approach. In both 
approaches the level of total defence spending is chosen a-priori as the threshold variable. For 
the growth equation, the estimated threshold is estimated at defence spending level of $384.77 
million, of which in the upper regime of the TAR model defence spending exerts an 
insignificant effect on economic growth and the relationship turns positive and significant in 
the lower regime. On the other hand, the empirical results associated with the production 
function produce a threshold estimate of $216.24, of which in the lower regime there is a 
positive and significant relationship between the two variables; whereas this relationship turns 
negative and significant in the lower regime. Similarly, Yang et. al. (2011) also make use of a 
two-regime TAR model to investigate the nonlinear relationship between military expenditure, 
threat and economic growth for a panel of 92 countries using data collected 1992 to 2003. The 
authors use initial income as the threshold variable in the regressions. The results show that 
there is a significant negative military-growth relationship for countries with initial incomes 
less than or equal to $475.93 whereas for the remaining countries with initial incomes greater 
than $475.93, the relationship turns insignificant. 
 
Lai et. al. (2005) investigate the arms race between China and Taiwan using a multi-
variate threshold vector autoregressive (MV-TVAR) model which is applied to two sets of 
military-growth data collected from two separate sources; namely, (1) the Chinese Statistics 
Yearbook (CSY) and (2) the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
Yearbook. The authors include the rival’s country’s growth in military spending within the 
MV-TVAR specification and thereafter select this variable a-prior as the threshold variable for 
the estimated regressions. For the case of China, both datasets reveal a threshold of 5 percent 
of which Chinese military spending leads her economic growth albeit in the lower regime for 
CSY data and in the upper regime for SIPRI data. Furthermore, both datasets for China’s case 
reveal that Chinese military spending leads Taiwan’s military spending. Similarly for the case 
of Taiwan, a threshold of 5 percent is found for CSY data, of which feedback causality is found 
between Taiwanese military spending leads economic growth as well as between China’s 
military spending and Taiwanese military spending in both regimes of the model. However, 
using SIPRI data, a threshold of 1.5 percent is found for the Taiwanese case in which causality 
running from military spending to economic growth is found in both regimes of the model and 
China’s military spending being found to lead Taiwanese military spending.  
 
And yet even the use of TAR models in the analysis of time series variables has faced 
severe criticism based upon its abrupt regime switching mechanism between regime 
coefficients (Phiri, 2015). Such criticisms laid the foundation for the next development in the 
empirical literature, which saw researchers turn their attention to the use of smooth transition 
regression (STR) models. What distinguishes this cluster of studies from earlier nonlinear 
studies is that the regime switching mechanism is conducted in a smooth manner as opposed 
to being abrupt, and, as previously mentioned, this is consistent with the stylized fact that 
economic entities who influence the variables do not behave simultaneously or in the same 
direction. One of the earliest studies to use such a framework is presented in Ocal (2002), who 
applies the STR model to investigate nonlinearities in the relationship between military 
spending in Turkey and military spending in Greece using data collected from 1956 to 1994. 
In similarity to Lai et. al. (2005), the authors include the rival country’s military spending 
within the STR regressions and the linearity tests confirm that the best fitting model is one with 
Greece’s military expenditure being the dependent variable and Turkey’s military spending 
being the transition variable. The estimation results of this model indicate an optimal threshold 
value of 5.2 percent of which below this value the effects of Turkish military spending on 
Greek military spending is negative and this relationship turns positive above the threshold.  
 D’Agostino et. al. (2011) also apply the STR model the nonlinearities in the military 
growth relationship for the US using data collected from 1958 to 2005. In order to model these 
nonlinearities, the authors rely on endogenous growth models nested in Cobb-Douglas 
production functions and further use seven different specifications of government spending in 
which government spending is broken down into military and non-military spending and each 
of these two components of government spending are further decomposed into consumption 
and investment elements. The empirical exercise results show that aggregate government 
spending in the US has an inverted U-shape relationship with economic growth, that is, a 
positive relationship exists between the variables up to some optimal point, which turns 
negative thereafter. When government spending is decomposed into military and non-military 
components, only the former retains its nonlinear relationship with economic growth. 
Furthermore, both consumption and investment components of military spending are found to 
exhibit a nonlinear relationship with growth whereas only the investment component of non-
military spending nonlinearly affects economic growth. Overall, the results show that military 
spending is productive for the US, while non-military spending does not significantly benefit 
economic growth unless it is through the channel of investment.  
 
3 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In adhering to the developments found in the literature, our study also makes use of the 
STR model to investigate nonlinearities in the military-growth relationship for South Africa. 
Our baseline STR model takes the following functional form: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0
′ 𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽1
′𝑥𝑡 𝐺(𝑧𝑡;  𝛾, 𝑐) + 𝜀𝑡       (1) 
 
Where yt is a scalar;𝛽0
′  and 𝛽1
′  are parameter vectors; xt represents the vector of 
explanatory variables; and t ~ iid N(0, h2t). The transition function G(zt; γ, c) is the transition 
function normalized and bound between 0 and 1. zt is the transition or threshold variable 
whereas γ and c are the transition parameter and the threshold parameter, respectively. In 
further specifying the transition function G(zt; γ, c), we use the following logistic function: 
 
𝐺(𝑧𝑡;  𝛾, 𝑐) = [1 + exp (−𝛾(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑐𝑘))]
−1      (2) 
 Where γ > 0 and c1 ≤ c2 ≤ … ≤ cm. For empirical purposes we restrict the STR model 
to the cases for k=1 and k=2. When k=1, the model parameters may change monotonically 
depending on the transition variable c, thus yielding the logistic STR (LSTR-1) model. When 
k=2, the parameters change depending upon whether the transition variable is below c1 or above 
c2, hence we refer to this regression specification as the logistic quadratic STR (LSTR-2) 
model. The initial specification stage of the modelling cycle consists of testing for linearity 
against the alternative of a LSTR model. Pragmatically, the LSTR model can be reduced to a 
linear model by imposing the constraint H0: γ = 0 or H0’: β1 = 0. However, the associated tests 
are nonstandard since the LSTR model contains unidentified nuisance parameters under the 
null hypothesis of linearity. To circumvent this identification problem we follow Luukkonen 
et.al. (1998) by replacing the transition function G(zt; γ ,c) by its first order Taylor expansion 
around γ = 0, which results in the following auxiliary function: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛽0
′∗𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽1
′∗𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡 + 𝛽2
′∗𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡
2 + 𝛽3
′∗𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡
3 + 𝜀𝑡
∗    (3) 
 
Where the parameter vectors 𝛽1
∗, 𝛽2
∗, 𝛽3
∗ are multiples of γ and 𝜀𝑡
∗=𝜀𝑡 + 𝑅3𝛽1
′𝑥𝑡, with R3 
being the remnant portion of the Taylor expansion. Hereafter, the null hypothesis of linearity 
may be tested by an LM test such that the Taylor series does not affect asymptotic distribution 
theory. By using auxiliary regression (3), we can test the null hypothesis of linearity as 
𝐻0
∗: 𝛽3
∗ = 𝛽2
∗ = 𝛽1
∗ = 0. If this is rejected, we then test 𝐻03
∗ : 𝛽3
∗ = 0, 𝐻02
∗ : 𝛽2
∗ = 0|𝛽3
∗ = 0 and 
𝐻01
∗ : 𝛽1
∗ = 0|𝛽3
∗ = 𝛽2
∗ = 0. The decision rule for selecting either a LSTR-1 or LSTR-2 model 
is thus as follows. Select a LSTR-2 specification if 𝐻02
∗  has the strongest rejection, otherwise, 
we select the LSTR-1 specification.  
  
In turning to our theoretical framework, we opt to model the military-growth 
relationship by incorporating a standard Cobb-Douglas production function within the 
neoclassical growth framework. Specifically, this involves specifying real output as a function 
of physical capital, human capital and technological progress i.e. 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾
𝜃1𝐻𝜃2         (4) 
    
Where Kt is the level of aggregate capital, Ht is the level of aggregate labour and At is 
a measure of technology. A number of authors, inclusive of Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2004) 
as well as Dunne and Tian (2015), have hypothesized that both total government expenditure 
as well as the export sector are likely to have a technology augmenting effect on the economy 
and can thus should be included in the aggregate production function:  
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾
𝜃1𝐻𝜃2𝐺𝜃3𝐺𝜃4𝑋𝐺𝑆𝜃5       (5) 
 
Where Gt and XGSt denote aggregate government spending and exports, respectively. 
Furthermore, Cuaresma and Reitsschuler (2006) as well as D’Agostino et. al. (2011) have also 
demonstrated on how aggregate government spending can be further divided between military 
(Mt) and non-military outlays (NMt) such that Gt = Mt + NMt. In referring to our STR 
regressions equations (1) through (3), we can transform the linear logarithmic form of the 
modified neoclassical growth equation (5) into the following STR empirical specification: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜃1𝐾𝑡 + 𝜃2𝐻𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑀𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑁𝑀𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑋𝐺𝑆𝑡 + 
                  (𝜃1
′ 𝐾𝑡 + 𝜃2
′ 𝐻𝑡 + 𝜃3
′ 𝑀𝑡 + 𝜃4
′ 𝑁𝑀𝑡 + 𝜃5
′ 𝑋𝐺𝑆𝑡) × G(zt; γ, c)   (6) 
 
From the above regression, the modelling and estimation process of the formulated STR 
regression can be outlined in the following steps: 
 
I. Test linearity against the LSTR alternative by using each of the explanatory variables as a 
possible transition variable. Once linearity is rejected, use the decision criteria to choose 
between LSTR-1 and LSTR-2 specification and choose the model with the highest rejection.  
II. For the chosen model, carry out a three-dimensional grid search over the values of zt, y and c. 
The optimal values are the ones which minimize the residual sum of squares (RSS). 
III. Estimate the chosen model using a Newton-Raphson algorithm to maximize the conditional 
maximum likelihood function. 
IV. Perform diagnostic tests (i.e. ARCH effects, tests of no error autocorrelation and parameter 
consistency) on the estimated model. 
 
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Data and unit root tests 
 
Our empirical analysis makes use of annual data collected from 1988 to 2015. The main 
sources of the data used in the study are (i) the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) online 
database from which we obtain our labour force growth data (lbr); (ii) the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook from which we get our growth in 
military spending (milex) data; and (iii) the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) online 
database from which we get our gross domestic product (gdp) growth rate; our growth rate of 
non-military government expenditure (non_milex), our share of investment in GDP (inv_gdp) 
and the growth of exports of goods and services (xgs). It should be noted that the growth rate 
of non-military government expenditure (non_milex) variable is calculated as the percentage 
change in the difference between total government expenditure and military spending. Before 
making any attempts at estimating of our empirical model, it is necessary to examine the 
integration properties of the time series variables. Given the time period of the data used in the 
study, we find it best to account for structural breaks when testing for unit roots. To this end 
we use Zivot and Andrews (1992) structural break unit root tests. These unit root test are 
performed with i) an intercept and ii) a trend. The results of the unit root tests have been 
reported in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1: Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root tests 
time series t-statistic breakpoint(date) 
 Intercept Trend intercept trend 
gdp -3.61 
(-5.28)*** 
-4.49*** 
(-4.38)** 
2008 2007 
inv_gdp -4.49 
(-5.69)*** 
-3.59 
(-4.59)** 
2007 2001 
lbr -0.94 
(-3.95) 
-3.20 
(-4.74)** 
1995 1998 
non_milex 2.61 
(-4.12) 
-3.19 
(-4.50)** 
1995 1995 
milex -3.99 
(-6.59)*** 
-4.46** 
(-5.00)*** 
1994 2000 
xgs -3.32 
(-4.34) 
-3.99 
(-4.13)* 
2008 2009 
Significance levels are given as follows: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent the 1 percent, 5percent and 10 percent significance levels respectively. 
The test statistics for first differences are reported in parentheses. The critical values for the Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root tests inclusive 
of an intercept only are as follows: 1 percent: -5.34, 5 percent:-4.80 and 1 percent: -4.58; the critical values for the unit root test inclusive of a 
trend are as follows: 1 percent: -4.93, 5 percent: -4.42 and 1 percent: -4.11 whereas the critical values for the unit root test inclusive of a trend 
and intercept are as follows: 1 percent: -5.57, 5 percent: -5.08 and 1 percent: -4.82. The optimal lag which is used to facilitate these tests are 
determined by the AIC information criterion. 
  As is evident from Table 1, the empirical results of the performed unit root tests 
obtained for the time series are quite mixed. One on hand, economic growth (gdp), investment 
(inv_gdp) and military expenditure (milex) are I(1) processes when the unit root tests are 
performed with an intercept, and on the other hand, the labour force (lbr), non-military 
expenditure (non_milex) and exports (xgs) are I(1) process when the tests are performed with 
a trend. However, we consider these results to be satisfactory since all observed time series, 
whether inclusive of an intercept or a trend, fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in 
their levels and only retain stationarity in their first differences. According to Engle and 
Granger (1987), this is sufficient evidence of an existing cointegration vector and we can thus 
proceed to estimate regressions formed from the time series without the fear of obtaining 
spurious results. Another thing worth noting from the results reported in Table 1 is that the 
various structural breaks detected in the time series correspond to the democratic shift of the 
South African economy in 1994, the monetary policy shift towards inflation targeting in 2001-
2002 as well as the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 which lead to a period of worldwide 
depression.  
 
4.2 STR Regression Estimates 
 
Having confirmed first difference stationary in the time series, we proceed to estimate 
the STR regression model. However, prior to doing so, we must first select our transition 
variable, that is, the time series variable which is responsible for the regime switching 
behaviour in the estimated model. In order to do so, we carry out the linearity tests for a set of 
candidate transition variables and the variable which gives rise to the strongest rejection of 
linearity (i.e. the smallest p-value) is chosen as the transition variable. In addition to verifying 
the appropriate transition variable, these tests will also serve to determine whether a LSTR-1 
or LSTR-2 model is an appropriate specification for the estimated regression associated with 
the selected transition variable. The decision rules for selecting the LSTR-1 and LSTR-2 
models were discussed in the previous section of the paper. The results of the linearity tests are 
reported below in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Linearity tests 
transition 
variable 
tests statistics decision 
 F F1 F2 F3  
inv_gdp 0.2213 0.3936 0.9349 0.0065 Linear 
lbr 0.2489 0.6678 0.2479 0.4129 Linear 
non_milex 0.0017 0.0935 0.0060 0.0042 LSTR-1# 
milex 0.0098 0.40351 0.0003 0.2687 LSTR-2 
xgs 0.1523 0.5469 0.0369 0.2144 Linear 
Note: The F-tests for nonlinearity are performed for each possible candidate of the transition variable and the variable with the strongest test 
rejection (i.e. the smallest p-value) is tagged with symbol #.  
 
Based on the results reported in Table 2, we observe that only two transition variable 
candidates reject the notion of linearity among the time series variables, those being, the 
military expenditure and the non-military government expenditure variables. However, of the 
two candidates for modelling nonlinearity, we further observe that non-military government 
expenditure is the more appropriate variable of the two transition candidates seeing that it 
displays lower p-values associated with the test statistics. Also given that the F3 statistic has 
the highest rejection associated with non-military government variable, we decide on fitting an 
LSTR-1 to the regression. As a compliment to the linearity tests, we also conduct tests of no 
remaining nonlinearity in the chosen transition variable. The results are reported in Table 3 
below and show that there is no remaining nonlinearity for the chosen transition variable. 
 
Table 3: Tests of no remaining nonlinearity 
F-statistic p-value 
F 0.0305 
F4 0.0639 
F3 0.5218 
F2 0.0103 
 
Subsequent to performing our linearity tests as well as our tests for no remaining 
nonlinearity, we proceed to estimate the appropriate LSTR-1 regression model with the non-
military government expenditure imposed as the transition variable and report the regression 
estimates in Table 3. Concerning our empirical estimates obtained from the estimation of the 
LSTR model, a number of interesting points can be highlighted. First of all, we obtain a 
significant threshold estimate of 11.65 for the transition variable of which there is substantial 
evidence of regime switching behaviour existing amongst a majority of the regression 
coefficient estimates. For instance, we find that the effects of both military and non-military 
spending switches from negative to positive when non-military expenditure exceeds an optimal 
threshold of 11.65. This result is particularly encouraging since it adheres to the theoretical 
intuition of an inverted U-shaped relationship between military spending and economic growth 
on one hand, as well as between non-military spending and economic growth, on the other 
hand. Notably, Cuaresma and Reitsschuler (2003) and D’Agostino et. al. (2011) find a similar 
inverted U-shape relationship between military spending and economic growth for the US 
economy, even though the authors are unable to establish one between non-military spending 
and growth.  
 
Another finding worth taking note of is that the coefficients of the labour force and the 
exports variables all turn from positive to negative as one moves from the lower to the upper 
regime of the LSTR model. Again, this finding implies that the positive effects of these growth 
determinants on economic growth begin to emerge once the ratio of military spending to 
economic growth exceeds 11.65 and it is only in this upper regime whereby the coefficient 
signs on these growth determinants are in coherence with what is dictated in conventional 
growth theory. Another interesting finding is that the regression estimates point to a negative 
effect of investment on economic growth estimate across both regimes. This negative 
investment effect has also being found in the work of Batchelor et. al. (2000) for South Africa 
and this finding contradicts conventional growth theory which hypothesizes of a positive effect 
of investment on economic growth. Nevertheless, there exists two academic explanations for 
this finding. Firstly, as put forward by Fortainer (2007), a greater part of South Africa’s 
investments are not ‘Greenfield investments’ but are rather mergers and acquisitions. The 
second reason is that the current high levels of public spending and budget deficits crowd out 
the positive effects of investment in the South African economy (Biza et. al., 2015).  
 
Table 4: STR regression estimates  
 linear part nonlinear part 
constant -115.10 
(0.00)*** 
378.02 
(0.01)** 
inv_gdp -0.91 
(0.00)*** 
-0.84 
(0.31) 
lbr 1.13 
(0.02)** 
-3.44 
(0.05)* 
non_milex 0.61 
(0.02)* 
-4.36 
(0.00)*** 
milex 8.37 
(0.00)*** 
-30.99 
(0.01)*** 
xgs 2.01 
(0.00)*** 
-2.60 
(0.00)*** 
γ 11.65 
(0.00)*** 
c 9.61 
(0.00)*** 
R2 0.95 
diagnostic tests on residuals 
LM(4) 8.47 
(0.02) 
ARCH(4) 4.02 
(0.86) 
J-B 0.32 
(0.85) 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are given as follows: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent the 1 percent, 5percent and 10 
percent significance levels respectively.  
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
Thus far, the empirical investigation into the military-growth relationship in South 
Africa has been dominated by linear frameworks. However, it has recently come to attention 
that the assumption of a linear relationship between military spending and economic growth in 
South Africa may be incorrect. Using annual data collected from 1988 to 2014, this study 
becomes the first to examine a possible nonlinear relationship between military spending, 
economic growth and other growth determinants for the South African economy. This is an 
important contribution to the literature due to the scarcity of empirical evidence on the subject 
matter for the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) region as a whole. Our paper argues that such 
nonlinearities can be effectively captured by a STR model which is theoretically more 
appealing in comparison to other competing econometric models. Indeed, our empirical results 
are coherent with the dynamics of the endogenous model of D’Agostino et. al. (2011) by 
suggesting an inverted U-shaped relationship between military spending and economic growth. 
The regression estimates also show that other growth determinants such as non-military-to-
GDP ratio, the labour force and the exports-to-GDP ratio also bear an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with economic growth. The empirical results also show that all regime switching 
behaviour is facilitated through the non-military-to-GDP ratio, of which below a rate of 11.65, 
the time series variables are positively correlated with economic growth whereas above this 
optimal rate the variables become negatively correlated with growth. The only exceptional case 
is with the investment variable, of which we find a negative effect on economic growth above 
and below the optimal threshold point.  
  
Former studies have found a negative relationship between military growth and 
economic growth for the South African economy and have therefore implied that government 
should lower military spending in order to enhance the country’s economic growth 
performance. However, due to the fact that our study finds regime switching behaviour between 
military spending and economic growth, a number of new policy inferences and possible future 
developments can be drawn from our overall empirical analysis. For instance, we find that the 
non-military-to-GDP ratio has been below its threshold level of 11.65 percent since 2000. In 
fact, the only periods which South African policymakers have managed to keep this ratio above 
11.65 percent was between 1998 and 1999. This implies that the South African economy is 
currently hindered by its currently high levels of military spending and this will be the 
prevailing issue if government does not allocate more of it’s total budget towards higher levels 
of non-military spending. And yet if government is to shift its resources from military spending 
to non-military spending, then which components of non-military spending would be more 
productive? Such questions can be addressed by decomposing the military and non-military 
spending components into their respective investment and consumption sub-components and 
therefore examining which of these sub-components is more productive. However, we leave 
such for future research endeavours and further suggest that the military-growth relationship 
be extended to other sub-Saharan African countries as a whole or as individual economies. 
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